Panther vs T-34: Ukraine 1943 (Duel)

OPEN LETTER TO AUTHOR DR. FORCZYKDear Dr. Forczyk, and All Interested Readers,I just finished reading your book _Panther vs. T-34: Ukraine 1943_. I found it to be awesomely engrossing reading. Handsomely done sir!What follows is not a review, but rather, a request for opinions and judgments from you, Dr. Forczyk, and an invitation to discussion and debate to everyone here on the topic of tank development and employment by the opposing sides in Europe in World War II.But first, my own stake in this game: I served as a U.S. Army enlisted soldier armor crewman in 1977-79 on M-60A1s. I was then accepted to West Point, graduating as a lieutenant in 1984. I continued serving in tanks as an officer. I led a platoon of “Improved Product” M1 Abrams 105mm-gunned tanks. Next, I was the Company Executive Officer (XO) for a company of early production batch M1A1 120mm-gunned tanks. I *never* served in combat as a tank crewman. During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, I worked in the S-4 (supply and logistics) staff section of a tank-mechanized infantry heavy brigade heavily involved in the invasion of Iraq to attack the Iraqi Republican Guard. In this supporting role, I was a minor participant in the Battle of Medina Ridge. I returned to Iraq in 2004-2005 and 2006-2008, serving on staff positions in brigade and division-level headquarters where my contact with tanks and tank crewmen was almost nil. I am now retired and spend a lot of time reading about the history of tank warfare.Okay now, let’s collectively try to figure out what the best policy for Germany would have been in balancing quantity and quality in designing, building, and deploying tanks during World War II, with this understanding:The Germans irretrievably lost the war at the very instant Hitler embraced the INSANE idea of making war on the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States ***all at the same time.*** Given reasonable levels of competence and courage on the part of the English and Russian speaking peoples, levels they most certainly had, Germany was automatically doomed in the face of the *combined* gigantic population bases, natural resource bases, and economic-industrial bases of the UK, USSR, and USA.So, the question really is, what should the Germans have done to take the longest time to lose and to inflict the greatest possible damage on the Allied armies?In other words, what should Germany have done to beat out Japan for the honor of being the first country in history to have atomic bombs dropped on it?In terms of how Germany should have designed, built, and deployed its tanks in this context, three options come into my mind:Option 1: Build the biggest possible number of (relatively) cheap tanks. This translates into stamping out improved Panzer Mark IVs, and nothing but Panzer Mark IVs, for the as long as the war lasts.Option 2: Build smaller numbers of more expensive, presumably better quality tanks, in exactly the manner the Germans did, giving us the Panther and Tiger as we know them today.Option 3: The same as Option 2, but, build something *other than* what we all have come to know as the Panther and Tiger. Perhaps make the Panther and Tiger spend another year or so in development before they are fielded in order to ensure that the worst flaws are worked out of them before they see combat?Next:****** Dr. Forczyk Sir, here’s a tough mind-grinder of a question for both of us, especially because we have both been leaders of tank crewmen ******:On page 75 of your book _Panther vs. T-34/85_, you admit that while Panther crewmen deaths in battle were notably low, T-34 crewmen deaths in battle were horrific in number; a T-34 crewman had only a slightly better than one-in-four chance of surviving his (or her!) tank being knocked out.And yet—you at least strongly imply that the T-34 was the better tank because it was able to drive long distances in enormous numbers when Russian generals needed it to.I presume that on the Western Front, you would favor the Sherman over the Panther for the same reason, again, notwithstanding the rather sickening mortality rate of Sherman crewmen compared to Panther, or at least compared to Tiger, crewmen.*** So, at last, here’s the question:BUT—while Russian and American generals may be happy they have T-34s and Shermans to work with at their level, how is a young soldier supposed to feel about that cost-benefit analysis while the last thing he smells in his life is the stench of his own flesh being incinerated inside his T-34 or Sherman?And while the Panther or Tiger that killed him is rumbling by in search of its next victim?Uh—sentimentality about the lives of soldiers totally aside, the most expensive and most difficult to replace subcomponent of any tank IS always ***the crew***.Here’s a real head-scratcher of a question I’ll invite everybody here to address:Is the so-called “best” tank in any given war necessarily *the same* tank YOU would prefer to be a crewman on? For example, maybe the T-34/85 was the best tank of World War II in terms of being the one tank that best embodied those qualities needed to win the war. But maybe, at the same time you call the T-34/85 the “best” tank of the war in overall terms of winning the war, YOU would prefer to be on a Tiger II/King Tiger as the best means to enhance your own chances of survival on the battlefield?I’ll ask myself another rhetorical question, answer it myself, and invite everybody here to argue in favor of their own pet answer:All else being equal, what was *in your opinion* “the best tank of World War II” /SLASH/ which tank would you have preferred to serve on strictly from the point of view of a young soldier who *has* to be on a tank of one model or another?Of course, the fallacy of this sort of question is that, in war, “all else being equal” *never happens.* There will always be intractable disparities in the innate intelligence and skill of crewmen, in the training of crewmen, in the leadership of crewmen, in the fighting spirit of crewmen, in maintenance and logistical support, in infantry, artillery, and air support, in whether one is attacking or defending, how the terrain is, how the weather is, etc., etc., etc.But—*assuming*—the impossible state that “all else is equal,” I am stuck in my choice of so-called “best” tank of World War II between a late-production Panther G and an M-26 Pershing.Caveats and Clarifications:1. The T-34/85 might have been in the running for my favorite tank were it not for how the excellence of the design of that tank on paper was negated by the atrociously poor quality of Russian workmanship and product finish: poor quality metal, poor quality work joining that metal, egregious interface between human crewman and machine at all stations (lack of intercom communications for all crewmembers, drivers having to use hammers to bash gear shift levers into place, etc.), poor quality optics to aim the gun, a lack of radios enabling all tanks to talk to each other, and so forth. The T-34/85 could have been a favorite of mine if had been built in a German factory by German technicians to German standards of workmanship and German machine tolerances.2. Yes, I know, the M-26 Pershing suffered from being underpowered for its weight and accordingly had failures of reliability in the drivetrain—hmm—just like Tigers and Panthers! But still: the Pershing has that 90mm gun on it, vastly better firepower and armor protection than the Sherman, and the generally excellent human-to-machine functioning typical of American tanks3. My pet late-production Panther G would be free from sabotage by rebellious forced or slave factory workers, and, it would not suffer from a shortage of exotic metals in its construction; all the exotic metals would be present in the correct amounts in my pet late-production Panther G to ensure optimal quality in every bit of its steel. Given all that, I would call my late-production Panther G the best blend of firepower, armor protection, mobility, and all-around design finesse on the World War II battlefield.Finally, here are suggested titles for some more of the excellent “Duel” series from Osprey Publishing:Panther A/G vs. T-34/85, 1944-45Panzer Mark IV F2/G/H vs. T-34/76, 1942-43Panzer Mark IV G/H/J vs. T-34/85, 1944-45Tiger I vs. T-34, 1942-44Panzer Mark IV G/H/J vs. Sherman, 1943-45Signed:Stephen W. RicheyMajor, U.S. Army, RetiredAuthor of the book _Joan of Arc: The Warrior Saint_

"Panther vs T-34: Ukraine 1943 (Duel)", by Robert Forczyk, is a book in the Osprey Duel format that compares the German Panther tank to the Soviet T-34 tank in 1943. The duel format is typically 80 pages long, and presents an analysis of the factors ... human, mechanical, and tactical ... of the two weapons systems being compared, describes how the weapons were developed and utilized, and includes drawings, photographs, and illustrations. Mr Forczyk does an outstanding job of setting the stage and presenting relevant data, anecdotes, and analysis of the tanks within a limited page count. I own a few books on the Panther tank and on Soviet tank development, and he summarizes in just a few pages what the other books took chapters to do, and provides interesting and well developed analysis and conclusions.Mr Forczyk states that the T-34 was the superior tank in 1943, basically because it was an outstanding design that had been refined over the course of several years and available in great quantities, while the Panther, particularly in 1943, was rushed into production and had several key weaknesses, the most serious of which was its extreme mechanical unreliability. I have no argument with the author's conclusions; given the situation Germany faced in 1943, there probably was no correct answer available to the Germans that would have enabled them to "win" the duel.As a long-winded aside to the above, the author criticizes the Germans for expending scare resources for an expensive and unproven tank like the Panther. The Panzer IV, by mid-late 1942, was upgraded and refined to the point that it was a rough match for the T-34. However, it was rapidly nearing the end of its capability to be further improved. With regards to armored forces, then, the Germans had only a few choices. They could either greatly increase the number of Panzer IV's and tank destroyers based on existing platforms, or they could attempt to produce smaller numbers of more technologically advanced tanks and tank destroyers, and try to win through having a superior weapon system. The Americans took the former approach with its Sherman tank ... although the much better Pershing was waiting in the wings, it was decided that the Sherman was "good enough" to get the job done, and rather than disrupt existing production lines, the Pershing was delayed. If the Germans had managed to somehow double the number of Panzer IV's produced in the early months of 1943 rather than producing Panthers, it is still doubtful that this would have allowed the Germans to hold on much longer in the Ukraine, and would have left them much worse off with regards to armored battles in 1944 when more effective Soviet tanks began arriving in quantity. But neither was producing the initially unreliable Panther an effective answer either ... history bears this out.To have any hope of finishing the war with a stalemate ... the best the outcome Germans could hope for by 1943 ... they would have had to first stop the Russians, and it is unlikely that any combination of weapons that they had the industrial capacity to produce in 1943 could have done this. Producing more Panzer IV's in 1943 rather than the Panther would probably have been more effective in the short run, albeit at the cost of putting even more stress on the German's fuel situation (abysmal) and hurting their efforts for 1944 and beyond. The bottom line is that the Americans and Soviets, through virtue of their superior production capabilities, could live with a tank arguably inferior to the Panther on an individual basis, and still win through attrition, if need be.I highly recommend this book.

Admitidely, I have not read many ospreys duels. From my point of view, the concept is likely to be slighly flawed from the start as it is really rare when two weapons are alone, not supported by any other arm, and facing eachother in a theater of war. And this is probably even truer for tanks duels. But I knew what I was buying so cannot complain.However, the information given in this book is so significant when weighted to the small price and small size of the book that it makes a reasonable purchase. Quite often, I found more information about panthers or T34s than a "specialised" osprey book on the specific tank. The great advantage of the duel series is that you get a lot of informations and details on the "tanks in action".More specifically on the present book, I found this book really well written. The quality of the pictures and the graphics is very high. I can pretty confidently say that I found everything I was expecting. It even has schematics of small battles.Talking more into the details, the mechanical problems that the early versions of the panthers faced are well described. Being an engineer, I wonder how the german tank designers decided to proceed with the tank chassis that was orginally designed for smth around 30t to smth like 45t ! The book clearly shows that the panther did not achieve what he was meant to become..a german T34 with high mobility.When compared to the T34 that was heavily tested to suit the eastern European warfare, the panther was obviously a failure. Another detailed that really surprised mewas the rate of fuel consumption of the panther. Knowing that Germany was already short of fuel at that time, no wonder things got worse.All in all a very good book that may convince me to buy more osprey duels. Thanks to the author.

good detail and analysis

Brilliant

I’m a sucker for the Panther, and I’m aware of its deficiencies, but this book does set a lot of things straight but just how bad it was when it entered service prematurely, and makes even me question it’s usefulness. The book is well written and researched, particularly the design and development of the 2 tanks, and the Kursk and related actions involving both types and their encounters, which usually actually favoured the T-34 in the outcome. How both tanks came about is well covered, the political issues that plagued getting them both introduced is very interesting and not usually covered, and adds more to the story than just why they choose the designs based on performance. The crew issue is interesting as I don’t really think of German tankers as being combat inexperienced at the time of Kursk, but there was obviously some new crew issues in the Panther units, not to mention lack of actually training on their new mounts due to a desire to not break them before they can see combat. The combat section is well written and detailed, focusing more on the actual Panther and T-34 engagements than the overall battle around them, and really puts into context the wearing down of German units through multiple lines of defence and the terrible serviceability of the new heavy units the Germans are fielding for the offensive. Maps, photos and diagrams are very good, only one photo is mislabeled as a Panther G when it’s an A model, recognizable by the hull. One more thing I think that’s not given enough attention is the crew visibility and awareness, where the Panther came with a cupola for better all round view by a dedicated commander, the T-34 wouldn’t see this as standard until later in the model 1943 production, and still suffered from having the gunner double in role which greatly hindered the vehicles awareness especially in attack. Great book, one of the better tank duel series titles,

I must to have for every WW2 tank enthusiasts.I lot of historical details for the T-34 and Pz Mark V.Some opinions.Battle events drawings not very clear sometimes.Good details about the Kursk battle.Simple, clean & cheap little book.