China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (New Cold War History)

China & the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 examines the relationship between Communist China and Communist Vietnam in the course of the two wars in Vietnam: The first Indochina War and the Vietnam War (the second Indochina War). The author provides many interesting insights on this love/hate relationship over the two decades with documentary support from Chinese archival sources and published collections.The relationship between the PRC and the DRV was complex because of the influence of the Soviet Union over Vietnam and the role of the United States in the Cold War period. North Vietnam was able to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict to receive aids from both masters, perhaps thanks to the U.S. escalation of the war which was perceived as threat to both China and the Soviet Union.Chapter One: This chapter reviews the history of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship through the early contacts between Ho Chi Minh and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During this time, Ho Chi Minh's Vietminh seized power in Hanoi in 1945 and began the war against the French, starting the first Indochina War. The CCP was fighting against the more powerful Chiang Kai-Shek's KMT forces. There was limited mutual assistance between the CCP forces and the Vietminh. Subsequently, after Mao founded the PRC in 1949, Ho vigorously sought assistance from the CCP and the Soviet Union. In their meeting in 1950, "Stalin told Ho that assisting the Vietminh was primarily a Chinese business" (p. 17). The author believes that the reason why Mao was eager to help Ho was Mao's vision of revolutionary internationalism when China was at the time also supporting North Korea. China's assistance to the DRV included both military and advice on land reform program.Chapter Two: With military assistance from China and their advice on mobilizing a huge peasant support for the war against the French, the Vietminh defeated the French after the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Zhou Enlai worked together with Soviet leaders in shaping their strategy regarding the Geneva conference. Under pressure from Zhou, North Vietnamese accepted the 17th parallel as the demarcation line dividing Vietnam into North and South, but this pressure might be perceived unfavorably by North Vietnamese negotiators (p. 63). While it is clear that without Chinese assistance, the DRV could not defeat the French, this period also started the beginning of friction between the two.Chapter Three: China continued its military and economic assistance to the DRV, but the "increasing animosity between Beijing and Moscow caught the DRV in a dilemma" (p. 86). Ho "decided to talk directly with Chinese and Soviet leaders to appeal for unity" (p. 87) but Ho's mediation was "obviously not successful" (p. 88). Eventually, North Vietnam couldn't maintain a strict neutral position in the Sino-Soviet split and "would move closer to Beijing in its ideological orientation" (p. 91).Chapter Four: The Geneva Conference on Laos brought a minor crisis. "Beijing and Hanoi increased their involvement in Laos" while "Moscow completely disengaged from the country" (p. 110). "Sino-North Vietnamese competitions in Laos constituted one of the reasons for the eventual breakdown of Beijing-Hanoi cooperation" (p. 111).Chapter Five: Despite their minor friction over Laos, "Hanoi moved closer to Beijing in the Sino-Soviet dispute" (p. 123). Soviet's indifference regarding Southeast Asia further pushed North Vietnam closer to China. "Le Duan commended Mao's theory of revolutionary war" (p. 125). "Moscow's economic assistance and exports to North Vietnam dropped in 1964" (p. 128).Chapter Six: The U.S. began escalating its military assistance to South Vietnam and attack on North Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin incident. At North Vietnam's request, China increased its military assistance significantly. "The total number of Chinese troops in North Vietnam between June 1965 and March 1968 amounted to over 320,000" (p. 135). This might reflect Mao's sense of insecurity regarding the American aggression. During this time, Hanoi was able to get "Beijing and Moscow to agree on a new arrangement for transporting Soviet arms through China to the DRV" (p. 154).Chapter Seven: Johnson's escalation of the war created a dilemma for the Soviet Union because Moscow didn't want "a direct confrontation with the United States over Vietnam" (p. 158). Kosygin proposed to the DRV and China a peaceful solution but Beijing rejected the Soviet proposal. China continued condemning "Moscow's cooperation with the U.S. scheme for `peace talks' on Vietnam" (p. 167). In turn, China clashed with the DRV's "strategy of negotiating while fighting" (p. 168) even though Hanoi might be only interested in "trick[ing] Washington into halting its bombing" (ibid.).Chapter Eight: The Tet Offensive contradicted to Mao's military doctrine and "revealed the independent nature of the decision making in the DRV" (p. 179). Sino-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate while Nixon "showed his desire to end the breach with China" (p. 181). The situation in Cambodia created tension between China and North Vietnam.Chapter Nine: "China's détente with the United States might push Hanoi further into the arms of the Soviet Union" (p. 195). The 1972 Spring Offensive showed Hanoi's miscalculation of the ability of Washington to react (p. 204). "Relations between Beijing and Hanoi continued to worsen during the remaining years of the war" (p. 208). In April 1975, North Vietnam succeeded in the war against the South. "In 1975, Beijing reduced aid to the DRV while increasing assistance to Cambodia" (p. 213). Tensions between China and North Vietnam were fully revealed during Le Duan's visit to Beijing in September 1975.The author believes that "it was not just the United States that lost the Vietnam War. China also failed in Vietnam." (p. 220). Mao was preoccupied "with the Soviet factor in the making of China's foreign policy" (p. 222) and that might explain the reason for Mao's willingness to tolerate North Vietnam's sometimes recalcitrant behavior.The author painted a vivid picture of the love/hate nature of the Sino-North Vietnamese relationship through the ups and downs of the world geopolitics during the 25 years from 1950 to 1975. The author took the view that the Vietnamese "had a tradition of looking to the Central Kingdom for models and inspiration" while trying "to preserve their independence and cultural heritage" (p. 6). This view is overly simplistic in light of the historical tradition of the Vietnamese animosity against China over a thousand years.The author did a good job in presenting the Sino-North Vietnamese relationship over the period in question. Without Chinese and Soviet assistance, North Vietnam would not be able to defeat the French in the first Indochina War (p. 62). During the Vietnam War, the Chinese assistance to North Vietnam was also much more significant than the DRV wanted to admit. The author provides a one-page description of all the military items provided by China to North Vietnam from 1964 to 1975 (p. 136). However, the overall presentation is mostly one-sided from China's point of view with only superficial treatment on what went on within the DRV leadership. In totalitarian regimes, personalities of leaders contribute significantly to an understanding of the history. In this context, "Hanoi's War" by Lien-Hang T. Nguyen is a good complement to fill this gap. In addition, "Behind the Bamboo Curtain" edited by Priscilla Roberts should also be consulted.

As time has passed, we are gradually getting more insight into the role that Russia and China played in the Vietnam War. This book focuses on China, whose substantial materiel, technical, and economic aid played a large role in North Vietnam's victory over the US and South Vietnam. Just as South Vietnam could not have survived without US aid, Southern rebels and North Vietnam could never have won the war without China.

We tend to go to war based upon our interests and ignore the interests of other belligerents. The author has done us a great favor by explaining, in detail, China's interests, policies, and actions in Vietnam's wars. Anyone thinking of attacking China or a Chinese neighbor would do well to study this book with great care.

This book is wonderfully written, easy to follow, and enables the reader to truly delve into the inner depths of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. This book is a detailed account of China’s role before, during, and after the Vietnam War. For any history scholar, this is a must read!

Very good

Very complicated book because of how much info is in it. However with time, it will really give you a lot of information what was going on there and the reason of the Vietnam War

Qiang Zhia did a commendable job of revealing and analyzing new information from Chinese sources on the 1950-1975 period. China's role in both the French and American involvement was explained far better that previous publications.

Giving this 5 stars because Dr. Zhai was my professor and his study of the Vietnam War is very solid and thorough, very in depth.

Tolles Buch über die Geschichte des Sino-vietnamesischen Krieges in allen Einzelheiten gut geschildert. Obwohl es ein "Geschichts-und Lehrbuch" ist, wird man nicht müde vom Lesen!Top!