American Boys: The True Story of the Lost 74 of the Vietnam War

AMERICAN BOYS (2014)By Louise EsolaOn the Facebook page DESTROYERS:GREYHOUNDS OF THE SEA, someone posted a quick blurb for a new book. The cover photo was that of a young seaman with a stupid grin on his face, standing in front of a stack of 5"/38 powder canister casings. I was instantly reminded of my time aboard a destroyer- a ship whose function was to, well, to put it bluntly, to destroy things. That cover photo could have been one that I snapped during my era.I instantly ordered a copy of the book from Amazon.When it arrived, I thumbed through it and was surprised to learn that it was the story of the 1969 collision of the USS FRANK E EVAN DD-754 and the HMAS MELBOURNE.It was perhaps in early 1976. I had been aboard the USS McKEAN DD-784 for a few months. I was thumbing through some Navy publication (ALL HANDS?)and there was an article about ships maneuvering. It had little to do with my rating so I ignored the text , but there was a photo that caught my attention. It showed the severed stern of a destroyer, still afloat.I was dumbstruck. The story explained that at 0300 the USS FRANK E EVANS collided with the much larger HMAS MELBOURNE. The EVANS was cut in half, the forward section sank within minutes , taking with it 74 crewmen.The EVANS was an Allen M Sumner-class. The McKEAN was a Gearing-class. The two were near twins, not identical twins. But they shared some DNA.The photo horrified me. If that exact same mishap would occur to us the odds of me surviving were very slim. I would have either have been asleep in my rack - in the part that sank, or been on watch in SONAR- in the part that sank-or been up in ASROC- in the part of the ship that took the direct hit from the MELBOURNE's bow. If it had happened while I was asleep in my rack, could I have gotten out? No power as all electrical would have been severed. The bow twisted and perhaps inverted. Sea water pouring in."The world as they knew it had gone sideways. Something had struck their back, their head, twisted their legs, tangled them in a mess of clothing, metal, and mattresses. In the middle of a deep, dark sea under a moonlit sky some would never live to see, the floor below them rose to become a wall, the wall became a floor. "It's called a bulkhead, son", they'd learned just weeks before, while tying their first knots and chipping paint." AMERICAN BOYS, page xxix.I asked my division officer if he was familiar with this incident. He told me that they had discussed it at his Destroyer School and that it was a classic case of "the one ship thought it was supposed to ZIG when it was supposed to have ZAGGED."Every night at sea, when I would finally hit my rack, I muttered a small prayer, "Lord, please let those on the bridge and CIC not screw up. "Author Louise Esola has a beautiful flow of words and her research is impressive. The only fault I can find in it is a rather petty one. She makes mention of sailors' rank, but not of their rate. The Navy and Coast Guard is unique in that rank determines ones pay and authority, but sailors identify most with their rate, their specific job that determines what it is that they do.I highly recommend this book. It should be in the library of all Tin Can Sailors.Below is a link featuring a San DIego TV station's interview with the author-https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SDpLmPlLskk&feature=youtu.be&app=desktop

I read the book after seeing a news story about the efforts to get the names of the Lost 74 on the Vietnam Memorial Wall. One of the Lost 74 was in my OCS class (Officer Candidate School) in 1968. His memory was dim and I wanted to remember and revisit. I wanted to know what happened that night.I'm glad the author wrote the book. I was pleased to meet some of the families. I am saddened to think about what all those young men missed in the intervening years and I am saddened by the loss experienced by their families.Unfortunately the author does not help much in understanding what happened. That may well be the fault of the Navy investigation and report. But she does little to help set the context. She spends about one paragraph on CIC (Combat Information Center). And virtually nothing on the training that the officers and enlisted men on watch received. Nor does she tell us what the fatal maneuver should have looked like. It wasn't a mystery. The ship had successfully carried out the same maneuver several times that night. Maybe it is to be expected that a journalist will spend pages talking about what other journalists wrote. While the author largely ignores the context of what there men were trained to do compared to how they did it, she spends a great deal of effort on the news of the times. While some reference to the times was helpful, this isn't a history of the 1960s and detracted from the focus of the book.All the officers and the radar men had been trained in the use of the maneuvering board, a piece of paper designed to rapidly solve issues of direction, speed, closest point of approach and other piloting issues. The officers had conducted these maneuvers in simulators and later using small craft called YPs. Once in the fleet, all would have observed and participated in such maneuvering. This maneuver was nothing new and did not require some mysterious “seaman’s eye.”The author doesn’t even discuss what a “watch” is. All those awake on the ship were standing watch. Just as the words imply, they were to keep a sharp eye on everything going on onboard and in the water around them. The JOOD and the OOD knew the maneuver was coming and should have made and discussed a planned response as soon as they came on watch.When these few minutes unfolded, the bridge and CIC would have been informed of the location of the lighted aircraft carrier by the lookouts; as soon as the lights are seen, the location and relative heading (direction) of the aircraft carrier would have been know and understood by any experience sailor; the CIC would have noticed the incorrect turn and made recommendations for corrective action; even without the maneuvering board, the relative positions of the ships would have been clear on the radar screens on the bridge and in CIC; a yellow grease pencil was commonly used to track the relative motion of other vessels directly on the radar screen. Why was no one on the bridge paying attention? There is no doubt that the CIC team would have been active. The Navy made a video about this event and said that the ships missed then collided as they continued to turn. The author refers to this possibility but ignores it.The OOD is depicted as disconnectedly reading Navy messages for hours. I have read thousands of such messages and none are interesting enough to keep one absorbed for such a long period of time.If the events transpired as depicted, then the OOD in particular was mentally disengaged to a degree that implies some mental or emotional disability. No one I knew went on watch, particularly as OOD, who did not feel a strong sense of responsibility to the ship and crew during his watch. Something very strange happened here with no explanation and the author pretty much ignores it. I was disappointed.

A very good Historical account. A very good read.