Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied

It is difficult to understand how anyone can really understand the enigmas and contradictions of 21st Century Iraq with out understanding its 20th Century origins. This remarkable book, successfully for the most part, attempts to provide that understanding.The Turkish Ottoman Empire essentially imploded at the end of WWI. For strategic reasons the UK was particularly interested in retaining control the former Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia (most of modern Iraq). This aim was complicated by the heady if unrealistic idealism of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson that greatly influenced the way the world was ordered after the "war to end all wars." Rather than simply establishing a colonial government over Mesopotamia, the UK was given a League of Nations `mandate' to exercise what is now called `nation building' and create a viable, democratic, and above all, a stable state called Iraq in place of the Ottoman province of Mesopotamia.This the UK was perfectly willing to do as long it could also ensure that its influence would predominate in the new state. The principal British architects for the new state of Iraq were soldiers and administrators under the India Office or the Colonial Office. Their efforts were hampered by serious misunderstandings of Iraqi society that caused them to divide Iraq between what they believed were a `natural', rural tribal society and a more sophisticated, but corrupt urban population. This misunderstanding caused UK officials to attempt to resurrect a tribal structure that was an anachronism by the end of the 19th Century. Tribal ties were far less important than those of landowner, clan, and village. In the end the UK execution of the mandate produced a dubiously stable monarchy that was not necessarily sympathetic to British interests. In spite what generally were good intentions, the UK only partially succeeded in carrying out its Iraqi mandate. This was do to two reasons: scarcity of funds to maintain the size of garrison to really exert UK control over Iraq in its formative period; and the failure of the UK to really understand the nature of the Iraqi people or the very real nationalism that had been awakened in them after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. This book to its credit manages to treat both the British and Iraqis with fairness and appears to have accurately captured the complexities of nation building.

Toby Dodge, a British political scientist who has studied Iraq extensively, has produced this book in order to educate others about one role that an occupying power has taken, 1920's Iraq via London, or 2003 Iraq via Washington.In 1920, The British officials in charge f Iraq imported many British ideas on Iraq. For example, the was a colonialist disregard for urban iraqis opposed to urban dwellers. This had larDodge ReviewToby Dodge, a British political scientist who has studied Iraq extensively, has produced this book in order to educate others about one role that an occupying power has taken 1920 Iraq via London, or 2003 Iraq via Washington.In 1920, The British officials in charge f Iraq imported many British ideas on Iraq. For example, the was, a colonialist disregard for urban Iraqis opposed to urban dwellers. This had largely to due to political feelings in Europe at that time. However, additionally, Iraq became a more difficult issue for the UK because of domestic issues. These issues includes, political, mainly economic, and other issues. But in both instances domestic politics played a part in the ultimate rule.gely to due to political feelings in Europe at that time. However, additionally, Iraq became a mere difficult issue for the UK because of domestic issues. These issues includes, political, mainly economic, and other issues. But in both instances domestic politics played a part in the ultimate rule.

This book is a must read for all. The book speaks volumes about a whole lot. This book proves the old saying history repeats itself. I know nowadays history isn't popular. That subject has been pushed aside for other things. This book shows the danger in that idea. We need to know history so as to hopefully understand the present and avoid disasters.The book gives a short history of the British occupation of Iraq in the 20s. As you read that story you have to keep telling yourself this book isn't about the current US occupation. The book shows through the British experience how history repeats itself. To bad no one in the White House read this book. You will see that the issues and problems the British experienced are the exact same problems the U.S. has been experiencing over the past 5 years in Iraq.Much of Iraq today is shaped by the British experience. To understand Iraq one has to understand the British experience. Their actions helped shape events today.This book also offers a good deep explanation of Iraq. It shows how their national bonds are very weak. You see how certain things like the transportation and tribal structure affects things.Everyone will see something in this book. Most of all you will see in very clear terms how history does repeat itself.

Dodge's book is about the British Mandate over the newly created Iraqi state. But the lessons are obvious for the American invasion and subsequent nation-building effort in Iraq. The result reminds one of the statement by Marx, attributing to Hegel the statement that history repeats itself, first as tragedy then as farce. This book should be read in conjunction with several others, the totality of these sending a strong message that not even a superpower can fully anticipate and control events--especially when such a country never really did decent post-war planning (and that which was done by the State Department was ignored).Consider Dodge's book along with: Risen, State of War; Bacevich, The New American Militarism; Packer, The Assassin's Gate; Diamond, Squandered Victory; and, dare I suggest it, Albert Somit's and my, The Failure of Democratic Nation-Building: Ideology Meets Evolution.It will be interesting to see how the history books treat the American war and occupation of Iraq. I fear that those histories will be most unkind; one can only hope that the United States can learn something from this. And the Dodge book can help inform that discussion. Would that the author had done more reflection on the relevance of the British adventure in Iraq to the current American nation building effort in Iraq.

Great