Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era)

In "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice", David Galula draws upon his professional experience (largely his time as a Company Commander and Battalion S3/XO in Algeria, as recounted in Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 to define a theory of counterinsurgency. Written in a similar timeframe, and shaped by almost identical experiences, to Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era), Galula's work has many similarities but in my view does a better overall job of both outlining a theory of counterinsurgency and offering a coherent and viable methodology of countering it.With an intellectual start point that "an insurgency is a competition between insurgent and government for the support of the population, which provides the sea in which the insurgent swims", Galula clinically describes the key features and strengths of insurgent and counterinsurgent forces and proposes clear principles for counterinsurgents. He does offer some intellectual challenges for conventionally-focused soldiers (see Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory (Praeger Security International) for an interesting examination of just how successful Galula's own operations were) but avoids some of the more dramatic and controversial prescriptions advocated by Trinquier. Although clear, straightforward and persuasive, this book isn't just full of good news - of particular importance is the observation that "the counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and his past ...a counterinsurgent can seldom cover bad or nonexistent policy with propaganda" (read as "Information Operations" or perhaps even "Twitter and Facebook posts" for the modern day). Perhaps even more important is the observation that, given the disparity of resources required by a counterinsurgent to exercise its responsibilities for security and governance compared to an insurgent, "intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential". This is sobering and unwelcome news to Western political and military leaders looking for quick, inexpensive solutions through "shock and awe" or UAV strikes against insurgent leadership.While Galula was a product of his time and focused on the insurgent/counterinsurgent dynamic of the Cold War, in my view many of his principles have far wider applicability across a range of peace support and stabilization operations as well. Every serious soldier should be at least familiar with his arguments - in many respects, I would consider this as a useful companion to the far more recent The Utility of Force as a means to understanding modern military and security issues.

"Counterinsurgency Warfare" by David Galula is a classic in the works on insurgency and counterinsurgency. Galula lays out both the theory and practice of insurgency and coutnerinsurgency in the most succinct prose and complete prose of any work available.The great value of Galula's book is the clear road map for opposing an insurgency. Caveat; clear is not necessarily simple, and even if it is simple, to quote Clausewitz "Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.""Counterinsurgency Warfare" makes it clear that a counterinsurgency campaign is more about domestic (for the afflicted nation) politics and law enforcement than it is about the use of traditional miltiary combat power. In the words of Galula, "a mimeograph machine may turn out to be more useful than a machine gun" (a mimeograph is an archaic, low resolution printer, for the younglings in the audience).The only aspect of insurgency that I would have liked to seen explored a bit more explicitly would have been the role of sanctuaries for insurgents. There are some references to insurgents having access to areas outside those controlled but the government they oppose, but the need for either exterior sanctuaries (like the Vietcong use of Laos and Cambodia, or the way Iraqi insurgents have trained in Iran) or interior sanctuaries ('no-go' zones like the FARC and other narco-terrorists establish, or parts of Sadr City) for insurgents, and the reciprocal need to for counterinsurgents to deny sanctuaries to the adversary was not expounded on.The other shortcoming is that Galula was writing in the 1960s. While there have been linear, evolutionary improvements in small arms, and other military technology, there has been explosive change in communications technology since this book was written. The role and impact of internet and cell phones is far beyond what Galula had experienced in his lifetime, and has had significant impact on the conduct of insurgency and counterinsurgency.If you have any professional or personal interest in insurgency or counterinsurgency, this is a "must read".E. M. Van Court

„Counterinsurgency Warfare“ by David Galula is a brief but striking handbook on the concept of insurgency, its variations and effective countermeasures against it with still great relevance for present situations.Written as a manual for military readers in 1964 Galula’s book provides a comprehensive understanding of the concept of insurgency in a brief and clear language. Although this might seem as a too academic angle on the topic, it is to be noted that Galula was one of the first to describe insurgency in such a way and thus lay the foundation of a thorough understanding of this kind of warfare, regardless of a specific national scenario. Thus he detached and abstract description of factors, means and effects is not to be seen as a fault, but rather a feature as he provides a framework of reference to use in a variety of conflicts.Although writing in 1964 Galula already addresses the majority of factors like the asymmetry between forces, prerequisites for successful insurgency, the doctrine to follow and possible angles of effective counterinsurgency correctly and in a surprisingly modern way. His understanding of counterinsurgency is clearly population-centric with intelligence lead operations to deny the insurgent control over the population. Although the formulation of the phases of an effective counterinsurgency campaign may appear overly simplistic, they should only be seen as a generic template for application in a specific scenario. Still Galula already understood the need for political legitimacy of a counterinsurgent government and thus also the need for political reform of the same to win elections and politicize the population by giving them a stake in the political confrontation.For all modern and reform-oriented thinking Galula is clearly not above critique. Although he does not overtly advise or discuss torture, like Trinquier does, there can be no doubt Galula also sees the need for the counterinsurgent to act against identified insurgents with the utmost ruthlessness. He views insurgents as enemies of the state and the people to be suppressed by overwhelming military force and not dealt with like criminals by the police. His application of military force, population control and intelligence operations, shaped by experience in Indochina and Algeria would not have been in alignment with modern limits to such endeavors.Overall Galula’s book is a dated but still very relevant and correct treatise on the subject of insurgencies and because of his briefness and directness a good starting point for anybody starting to read on the topic of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.

The classic review of counterinsurgency warfare, written in the early 1960's. Concise, clear and direct in dealing with the principles for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent.

I found about this book on a recent issue of "Foreign Affairs (vol.92/1, page 75). It seems that it had a major influence on general Petraeus and on the USA counterinsurgency field manual of 2007. It is a really absorbing reading for its clarity, logical depth and underlying experience. David Galula was a French officer and served in WW2 and then in China, Greece, Indochina and Algeria. He died in 1967and the book is particularly based on the operations in the wars in those areas.. Its first and major point is the "asymmetry" between Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, arising from the disproportion of strength at the outset and from the difference between their assets and liabilities. The established armed forces find their training, organization and weapons largely irrelevant to the new task and need to re-adjust to a new form of warfare in which the object is not killing enemies but to control and gain the support of the population.The book details the prerequisites and doctrine of Insurgency, as applied with success by Mao Tse-tung .and the Vietminh, as well as the failures in Greece and Malaya.The second half of the book presents a sharply clear analysis of the strategy, tactics and operations of Counterinsurgency. Four laws are listed as essential: 1) support of the population is necessary - 2)support is gained through an active minority - 3)support by the population is conditional - 4) intensity of effort and vastness of means are essential..The strategy must be based on a step-by-step approach, selecting areas and making their control irreversible.The tactics require single direction, with the primacy of the political over the military power, coordination of efforts, primacy of the territorial command, adaptation of minds and of the armed forces to the new requirements.The last chapter, "Operations" , details eight steps to apply in each selected area: 1) expulsion of the insurgent forces - 2) deployment of static units in close contact with the population, while a mobile unit is kept ready to intervene where and when necessary - 3)contact with and control of the population 4) destruction of the insurgent political organization - 5) local elections - 6) testing the local leaders - 7) organizing a party - 8) winning over or suppressing the guerrillas.The book is only 99 pages long but its depth, clarity and concentration of logics, common sense and practical examples, make its reading a really unforgettable experience.One really feels to have learned a lot and to be more prepared to understand the present and more recent military events.

I needed to carry out some research for a presentation, I bought this book along with two others.This uses a wealth of examples to help understand key insurgency/coin concepts. My pages are now covered in extra notes(pencil) which I can only take as a good sign. I really couldn't put this book down. The author effectively argues through the key points of a COIN model. Which actions have worked , which haven't as well as the motivations and catalysts for insurgency itself. A very balanced book, and a great read.Very happy with my purchase. I would especially recommend to anyone employed in the military or military environments.